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NOTE
The Path to Habeas Corpus Narrows:
Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)
Sharad Sushil Khandelwal

The enforcement of the U.S. Constitution within the criminal
justice system is an odd subspecies of constitutional law. In areas
other than criminal law, federal courts act as the ultimate guaran
tors of constitutional rights by providing remedies whenever viola
tions occur.1 Criminal law, however, is different by necessity; the
bulk of criminal justice occurs in state courthouses, leaving constitu
tional compliance largely to state judges.2 The U.S. Supreme
Court, of course, may review these decisions if it chooses,3 but a
writ of certiorari can be elusive, especially given the Court's shrink
ing docket.4
After World War II, however, this feature of criminal constitu
tional law came under attack. Many critics, particularly members of
the civil rights movement, saw state judiciaries as insensitive to de
fendants' constitutional rights and demanded more extensive fed
eral oversight of criminal law.5 In its 1953 decision Brown v. Allen,6
the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the system of federal habeas
corpus to provide such supervision.7
1. See U.S. CoNST. art. III,§ 2 ("[t]he judicial Powers shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution"); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL Ju.
RISDICTION § 5.2, at 248 (2d ed. 1994).
2. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043 n.8 (1983) ("The state courts handle the vast
bulk of all criminal litigation in this country."); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
I SRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3-4 (2d ed. 1992). Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) also
provides relief to victims of state actors' constitutional and statutory violations, such suits
only provide monetary, declaratory, or injunctive remedies. See CHF.MERINSKY, supra note 1,
§ 15.4.2, at 808. Habeas corpus provides a different range of remedies, including commuta·
tion of the death penalty, release conditional on a new trial, and even unconditional release.
See 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus PRACTICE AND PRO·
CEDURE §§ 33.1-.4 (2d ed. 1994).
3. See CHF.MERINSKY, supra note 1,§ 10.2, at 574.
4. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME CouRT PRACTICE 36 (7th ed. 1993).
5. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note l,§ 15.2, at 787-88.
6. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
7. Habeas corpus is a broad term encompassing three separate systems of relief: state
habeas, federal habeas for federal prisoners, and federal habeas for state prisoners. While
the statute at issue in this Note only affects the last of these, all three provide prisoners
collateral avenues of attack on their criminal conviction. See CHF.MERINSKY, supra note 1,
§ 15.2, at 785-86 (discussing both types of federal habeas); LARRY YACKLE, PosTCONVIcnoN
REMEDIES§§ 2-6 (1981) (discussing state habeas).
434
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Federal habeas corpus for state convicts works in the following
way: Prisoners convicted in state court can seek in federal district
court a writ of habeas corpus that collaterally attacks the constitu
tional underpinnings of the state court's judgment.8 If the federal
court finds a constitutjonal violation, it issues the writ, forcing the
state to release the prisoner from custody.9 In effect, federal
habeas corpus serves as a means of federal appeal for state prison
ers, providing a vehicle for federal enforcement of state prisoners'
constitutional rights.10
The strength of this system, however, fundamentally depends on
the extent of review permitted federal courts. If a federal court re
views a state judgment under a de novo standard of review, it can
grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever it simply disagrees with a
state court's constitutional interpretation.11 Alternatively, a defer
ential standard of review greatly reduces the reach of a federal
court's authority, as a federal court may issue the writ only when it
finds the state court's decision unreasonable - not merely when it
disagrees with that decision.12
With the Brown decision, federal habeas corpus became a pow
erful substantive remedy.13 Habeas corpus petitions assert that a
state court has incorrectly decided one of three types of questions:
legal, factual, or mixed.14 Under Brown, a federal court applies de
novo review to the following two categories:15 (1) legal questions,
in which the petitioner challenges the state court's determinations
of what rule governed an issue,16 and (2) mixed questions, in which
the petitioner challenges the state court's application of a legal rule
8. See generally 1 LIEBMAN & IiERlZ, supra note 2,§§ 2.1-.7.
9. See, e.g., id. § 2.3, at 17.
10. Federal habeas corpus is a collateral remedy and not a replacement for direct appeal.
Federal habeas, however, has an "undeniable appellate flavor." See Larry W. Yackle, A Pri
mer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 381, 403 (1996). Indeed, many have
concluded that the two are nearly identical. See 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 2,§ 2.4(b)
& n.2, at 19.
11. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) (describing de novo review as
plenary review); BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990) (defining de novo to mean
"afresh; a second time"); 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGIIT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2589, at 608 (1995) (noting that conclusions of law are "freely
reviewable").
12. See 9A WRIGIIT & MILLER, supra note 11,§ 2585, at 571-74.
13. Soon after Brown, the Court also eliminated many of the procedural hurdles encoun
tered by habeas corpus petitioners, further increasing the extent of the federal courts' author
ity. See generally 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 2,§ 2.4(d).
14. It has often proved difficult to distinguish between these categories. See Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985). The absence of clearly demarcated boundaries separating
these types of questions further complicates the determination of the appropriate standard of
review.
15. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506-07 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.).
16. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 591-92 (6th ed. 1990); see also 9A WRIGIIT & MILLER,
supra note 11,§ 2588, at 604-05.
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to the facts of a particular case.17 Under Brown, federal courts
deferentially reviewed only the remaining category:1s factual ques
tions, or the state court's findings of what happened in a case.19
Because only legal and mixed questions can implicate constitutional
issues,20 the Brown Court's designation of a de novo standard of
review for these questions, later codified by Congress at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254,21 substantially extended the ambit of the federal judiciary's
authority.22
Yet this powerful system had costs. Victims and their families
found habeas corpus a torturous process, prolonging their ·agony by
adding another layer of "appeals" to an already overburdened
criminal justice system.23 It also led to inefficient expenditures of
courts' time and attention, with federal judges facing towering
stacks of barely legible handwritten petitions, very few of which
were likely to raise valid constitutional claims.24
In this landscape of competing interests, the Supreme Court be
gan to narrow the path to habeas corpus. A series of decisions in
the 1990s resurrected many of the procedural hurdles the Court had
eliminated during the 1960s.25 Nevertheless, the Court has not al17. See Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995); see also 1 LIEBMAN & H ERTZ,
supra note 2,§ 20.3(d), at 571-73 (listing a variety of issues that have been held to constitute
mixed questions on federal habeas).
18. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 506-07 (Frankfurter, J.).
19. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
20. The federal court may question the state court's factual findings only to the extent
that "there is no finding," that "the finding is inadequate," or that the court "appl[ies] an
improper legal standard." 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 2,§ 2.4(b), at 21-22.
21. The statute only explicitly codified the standard of review for factual questions. Nev
ertheless, some scholars interpret the statute as implicitly codifying a de novo standard for
legal and mixed questions. See 1 id. § 2.4(d), at 65 n.270.
22. See generally James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack
on Habeas Corpus IDirect Review Parity, 92 CoLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2011-12 (1992) ("The guts
of the habeas corpus remedy [was] de novo review of mixed legal and factual questions.
Adoption of [a deferential standard) would be a serious, perhaps mortal blow to the writ's
function
).
23. See, e.g., Elizabeth Shogren, Senate OKs $1 Billion Anti-Terrorism Measure, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1996, at Al.
24. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("It must preju
dice the occasional meritorious [habeas] application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones.
He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the
needle is not worth the search."); Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex
Procedure for a Simple Process, 11 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1019 (1993) ("Without change, we
will continue to toil under a procedural system that breeds judicial inefficiency, delay, public
misunderstanding, and fundamental unfairness.").
25. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (permitting writ only if
constitutional wrong has a '"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict"'), overruling Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 (1968) (per curiam); Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. l, 5, 11-12 (1992) (tightening standard for excusing petitioner for
failure to develop a material fact during state proceedings), overruling in part Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Many commentators describe these and other recent Supreme
Court decisions as having crippled federal habeas review. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, Habeas
•

.

.
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tered the underlying de novo standard of review for legal and
mixed questions. In its ,1989 decision Teague v. Lane,26 however,
the Supreme Court did make a significant inroad into the scope as opposed to the standard - of review. Teague instructed federal
courts to review petitioners' convictions against federal case law as
it existed at the time of conviction rather than applying subsequent
developments in federal case law retroactively.27 While affecting
the scope rather than the standard of review, Teague represented
the first retraction of the reach of the federal courts' authority to
review state court convictions for constitutional infirmities.
In 1996, Congress took the Court's restrictive approach one cru
cial step further by altering the core of federal habeas corpus: the
de novo standard of review for legal and mixed questions. Inflamed
by the terrorist assault on a federal building in Oklahoma City,2s
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective ·Death Penalty
Act.29 Title II, section 104 of this Act amended the codified stan
dard of review found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to provide that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States
3o
.

.

.

.

Three interpretations of the 1996 amendment to section
2254(d)(1) have emerged. A district court in the Third Circuit,31 a
federal appellate judge,32 and an influential commentator33 argue,
each on different grounds, that the amendment does not change the
preexisting de novo standard of review for legal and mixed ques
tions. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits hold that the amendment lim
its de novo review for legal questions and installs a deferential
Corpus As a Crucial Protector of Constitutional Rights: A Tribute Which May Also Be a
Eulogy, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1477, 1483·89 (1996).

26. 489 U.S. 288, 209-310 {1989) (plurality opinion). The full Court adopted Teague in
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

27. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
28. See Susan Aschoff, Critics Say Rights Lost in Terror Fight, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 29, 1997, at lA, available in 1997 WL 6205792.
29. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West
Supp. 1997); see also Tabak, supra note 25, at 1477 ("A more accurate rephrasing of the title
would have been the . . . Anti-Habeas Corpus Act of 1996.").
30. 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d).
31. See Buehl v. Vaughn, No. 95-5917, 1996 WL 752959, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1996).
32. See Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 778-79 (5th Cir. 1996) (Garza, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997).
33. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 381.
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standard for mixed questions.34 Finally, two district courts in the
Ninth Circuit hold that the amendment creates a deferential stan
dard of review for both legal and mixed questions.35
This Note asserts that the 1996 amendment to section
2254(d)(1) remodels federal habeas corpus review of state court
convictions in two ways. First, the statute as amended dictates the
scope of review for both legal and mixed questions by limiting the
precedent available in those analyses to clearly established legal
principles set out by the Supreme Court. As Part I argues, this
change codifies the Teague v. Lane retroactivity rule and adds an
additional restriction that further narrows the scope of review. Sec
ond, the statute separately addresses the underlying standards of
review for legal and mixed questions. Part II discusses the two con
stituent clauses of section 2254(d)(l), contending that the "contrary
to" clause governs legal questions while the "unreasonable applica
tion" clause governs mixed questions. Part III asserts that the "con
trary to" clause establishes a de novo standard of review for legal
questions. Part IV argues that the "unreasonable application"
clause creates a deferential standard of review for mixed questions.
I.

THE SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Part contends that the statutory language "clearly estab
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
34. See Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 766-69; Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 868-74 (7th Cir. 1996)
(en bane), revd. on other grounds, No. 96-6298, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 3998 (June 23, 1997). The
Third Circuit has also indicated support for such a reading, although it has so far declined to
resolve the issue. See Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1102-05 (3d Cir. 1996); Dickerson
v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1996).
The First Circuit and a court in the Eleventh Circuit have recently adopted an interpreta
tion of § 2254(d)(l) that mirrors in result, if not in form, the understanding of the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits. See Martin v. Bissonette, No. 96-1856, slip op. at 17-24 (1st Cir. May 29,
1997), vacated on different grounds, 118 F.3d 871 (1st Cir. July 11, 1997); Green v. Wharton,
No. 4:96-CV-0142-HLM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10329, at *5-15 (N.D. Ga. July 15, 1997).
This alternative interpretation argues that § 2254(d)(1)'s two clauses jointly govern legal and
mixed questions. See, e.g., Martin, No. 96-1856, slip op. at 22. If the legal or mixed question
contained in a habeas petition has already been decided by a Supreme Court precedent, the
de novo "contrary to" clause governs the claim; if the legal or mixed claim involves an issue
that has not been directly decided, the deferential "unreasonable application" clause governs.
See, e.g., Martin, No. 96-1856, slip op. at 22-24. While the form of this interpretation is differ
ent from that of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, according to this theory's proponents, "it is
unlikely to produce results that differ very much, in practical effect, from these two cases"
because "pure questions of law often will be controlled by existing Supreme Court precedent,
while mixed questions of law and fact more frequently require a court to extrapolate from
available caselaw." Martin, No. 96-1856, slip op. at 24. Thus, the de novo "contrary to"
clause will often govern legal questions, while the deferential "unreasonable application"
clause will typically govern mixed questions. This Note disagrees with this interpretation and
contends that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have the better argument. See infra note 65.
35. See Perez v. Marshall, 946 F. Supp. 1521, 1532-33 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd. without opin
ion, No. 96-56705, 1997 WL 469645 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1997); Duncan v. Calderan, 946 F.
Supp. 805, 813 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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United States"36 amends the scope of review for both legal and
mixed questions. The language restricts the precedent available for
those analyses to a specific and narrow body of law: the Supreme
Court's case law as it existed at the time of the petitioner's convic
tion. Section I. A contends that the language "clearly established
Federal law" codifies the Teague v. Lane retroactivity rule. Section
l.B argues that the text "as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States" further restricts the precedent available to
habeas petitioners to include only Supreme Court decisions.
A.

"Clearly established Federal law"

According to the statute, a court may issue a writ of habeas
corpus only if the state court criminal conviction violates "clearly
established Federal law."37 This section argues that the phrase
"clearly established" instructs federal courts to use the strict Teague
retroactivity test to ascertain the boundaries of the federal case law
available to conduct their analysis. This section also rebuts the ar
gument that Teague changed the standard, as opposed to the scope,
of review.
The Teague Court ruled that federal courts should grant a writ
of habeas corpus only if a petitioner's conviction is inconsistent with
federal case law as it existed at the time the petitioner's conviction
became final.38 It did this by holding that habeas petitioners gener
ally could not rely on precedent handed down after their conviction
became final.39 The Court, however, allowed petitioners to base·
their claims on later cases if those cases simply elaborated doctrines
that were explicitly or implicitly contained within federal precedent
at the time of conviction.40 The Court required federal courts to
apply retroactively these postconviction cases containing what the
Court called "old rules."41
The Supreme Court has made it very difficult, however, to hold
that a case expounds an "old rule." A case applies an old rule only
if the legal proposition it contains was "dictated by precedent ex36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(l) (West Supp. 1997).
37. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(l).
38. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1988).
39. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
40. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Additionally, the Court recognized two exceptions to the
Teague doctrine. First, a new rule will be retroactively applied "if it places 'certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe."' 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring)). Second, a new rule will be retroactively applied "if it requires the
observance of 'those procedures that ... are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""'
489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted)).
For discussion of how the 1996 amendment to § 2254(d)(l) affects these exceptions, see infra
note 45.
41. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 299-302.
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isting at the time the defendant's conviction became final. "42 As
sessing whether precedent "dictates" a rule is a reasonableness
inquiry; that is, the retroactivity principle "validates reasonable,
good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state
courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later deci
sions. "43 Thus, while Teague permits federal courts to apply retro
actively some cases handed down after the petitioner's conviction, it
also narrows that category to a very small set of cases.44
The 1996 amendment to section 2254(d)(l) should be read to
adopt the Teague rule of retroactivity.45 The statute addresses the
propriety of the state court's determination, inquiring as to whether
that analysis "resulted in a decision that was" in dereliction of
42. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 491 {1990) {"Even were
we to agree with [petitioner's] assertion that our decisions in Lockett and Eddings infonn, or
even control or govern, the analysis of his claim, it does not follow that they compel the rule
[that] [petitioner] seeks." (emphasis added)); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 {1990)
(holding that· a postconviction case was not applicable retroactively where the legal proposi
tion to be applied "was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" at the time the state
court made its determination).
43. Butler, 494 U.S. at 414.
44. The Supreme Court's record on Teague analysis is instructive. Of the twelve cases in
which it has applied Teague, the Court has applied precedent retroactively only twice. Com
pare O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969 {1997) {holding that no retroactive application
should occur) and Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S. Ct. 1517 {1997) (same) and Gray v. Nether
land, 116 S. Ct. 2074 {1996) (same) and Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994) (same) and
Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993) (same) and Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993)
(same) and Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (same) and Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227
(1990) (same) and Safjle, 494 U.S. at 484 (same) and Butler, 494 U.S. at 407 (same) with
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (applying retroactively) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989) (same).
45. A question remains as to whether§ 2254(d){l) codifies the exceptions to the Teague
doctrine. See supra note 40. Admittedly, neither§ 2254(d)(l) nor its accompanying legisla
tive history explicitly discuss the Teague exceptions. Nevertheless, this Note argues that
when Congress used the phrase "clearly established," it meant to codify the entire Teague
doctrine, including the exceptions.
First, Congress assumed that the Teague exceptions would continue to exist. In a separate
1996 amendment to§ 2254, Congress instructed federal courts to hold an evidentiary hearing
if the petitioner's claim relies on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). Yet according to Teague, the only
"new rules" that are applicable to a habeas corpus petition are those that meet one of the two
specified exceptions. See supra note 40. If this provision is to have any meaning, see infra
text accompanying note 77, then the Teague exceptions must still exist.
Second, the statute should be interpreted to codify the Teague exceptions because they
have "roots in due process concerns," and so eliminating them might raise constitutional
objections. See Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus
Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1868, 1884 (1997). These constitutional
objections are arguably unpersuasive given Congress's past experience in restricting habeas
merely to jurisdictional issues without raising due process concerns. See infra text accompa
nying note 132. The law underlying the due process clause has dramatically changed since
then, however. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution ofthe
1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996). Thus, there is at least an open question as to
whether the Teague exceptions are constitutionally required.
In practice, though, the resolution of this issue should make little difference given the
narrowness of the exceptions to the Teague rule. See, e.g., O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1973.
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"clearly established Federal law."46 This focus on the adequacy of
the state court's ruling, coupled with the use of the past tense, di
rects federal courts to evaluate that state decision using the federal
case law available to the state court when it made its decision. This
statutory command echoes Teague's emphasis on habeas corpus's
fundamental aim of deterring state court error rather than necessar
ily guaranteeing justice for the defendant at a later date.47
Section 2254(d)(l) also employs the same strict approach to ret
roactivity as does Teague. 48 To determine whether a legal proposi
tion existed in federal case law at the time petitioner's conviction
became final, Teague probes to see if the relevant case was "die46. 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2254{d){l).
47. The Supreme Court reasoned that habeas's primary function is to deter state courts
from violating defendants' constitutional rights at trial and on appeal. See Saffle, 494 U.S. at
488. Retroactively applying new developments in the law, the Court observed, could not
further this purpose, as a state court cannot accurately predict if and when the federal judici
ary will hand down a decision changing the law. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 306-07, 310. Post
conviction cases that include "old rules," however, do not materially change the law, nor do
they "break[] new ground or impose[] a new obligation on the States or Federal Govern
ment." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Because the state courts should have been aware of these
legal propositions when making their decisions regarding the petitioner's conviction, the
Court required federal courts to apply these cases retroactively. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 30607.
48. Furthermore, the phrase "clearly established" relates indirectly to the Teague doc
trine, further suggesting an inherent link between the statute's use of the phrase and the
Teague rule. "Clearly established" is the explicit standard in qualified immunity doctrine.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 & n.30 {1982) (noting that qualified immunity
applies to government officials in order to protect them from suit brought directly under the
Constitution or 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" (emphasis
added)). In tum, the qualified immunity doctrine closely resembles Teague analysis. See Kit
Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of
Constitutional Law, 33 Aruz. L. REv. 115, 115 {1991). Even the Supreme Court in Sawyer v.
Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 {1990) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 {1987))
implicitly recognized these similarities by citing a qualified immunity case to help explain its
Teague analysis. Lower courts have also suggested that the two are identical, see, e.g., Al
dridge v. Hill, No. 95-55841, 1996 WL 528513, at *l (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1996) (explaining, in
the parlance of qualified immunity, how Teague analysis works), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 988
{1997), as have commentators, see, e.g., Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and
New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 442 n.75 (1994) (listing commentators). The Fourth
Circuit went even further when it noted that the qualified immunity doctrine, the Teague
retroactivity principle, and the 1996 amended version of§ 2254{d)(l) all embody the same
core concept. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1223 (4th Cir. 1996), affd., 117 S. Ct.
1969 (1997).
It is true that qualified immunity, the Teague doctrine, and§ 2254{d){l) do not have the
same objective. For this reason it has been argued that the "clearly established" language
does not indirectly invoke Teague. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (en
bane), revd. on other grounds, No. 96-6298, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 3998 (June 23, 1997); Yackle,
supra note 10, at 403-07. This Note claims, however, only that the statute borrows the
"clearly established" language and operating mechanism from qualified immunity doctrine
- not its objective. See Kinports, supra, at 115 (noting that Teague and the qualified immu
nity doctrine operate by forgiving erroneous interpretations of the law unless unreasonable).
Indeed, these differences in purpose might explain why no one in Congress analogized the
statute to qualified immunity doctrine. Cf. Yackle, supra note 10, at 406 (arguing that Con
gressional neglect of this point undermines the qualified immunity connection).
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tated" by preexisting precedent.49 In requiring case law to be
"clearly established," the statutory text invokes the core concept of
the Teague doctrine. Certainly a federal judge who describes a legal
proposition as "dictated" by precedent can also call it "clearly es
tablished." Conversely, if a judge labeled a legal proposition as
clearly established in existing case law, it would be natural to as
sume that reasonable minds could not disagree over its existence.
The statutory mandate and Teague's requirement appear identical.
The legislative history never refers to Teague, nor does the stat
ute track the language of Teague or its progeny. Some may thus
decide that section 2254(d)(l) does not codify Teague. That conclu
sion, however, may be hasty. Congress may have wisely chosen to
avoid mentioning Teague because the Court itself is split as to what
its decision means.50 Regardless, the plain language of the statute
best supports the interpretation that "clearly established" instructs
federal courts to apply the Teague rule when determining which
precedent to use in their analyses of state convictions.
This retroactivity limitation changes the scope of review by
which legal and mixed questions are analyzed but leaves the stan
dard of review untouched.51 One way to understand Teague's rela
tionship to the governing standard of review is to realize that they
involve two separate stages of analysis.52 First, the federal court
uses the Teague retroactivity rule to determine which federal cases
are available to analyze the petitioner's conviction.53 This can be
described as a choice of law rule sorting out which legal principles
49. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
50. See infra note 51.
51. The Court recently considered explicitly changing the standard of review in mixed
habeas questions from de novo to deferential. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 294-95
(1992) (plurality opinion). The Court had requested additional briefing regarding whether,
given Teague, a federal habeas court should afford deference to state court determinations
applying law to the specific facts of a case. See Wright v. West, 502 U.S. 1021 (1991) (request
ing briefing). Despite spending a great deal of time on the proposal, the Court eventually
declined to resolve the issue. See Wright, 505 U.S at 294-95 (plurality opinion).
Three Justices argued that the Court should extend Teague to mixed questions. After
presenting Teague as having created a deferential standard for legal questions, Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, observed that factual questions
were also reviewed deferentially. Given that, they noted that "it makes no sense
for a
habeas court generally to review factual and legal determinations deferentially, but to review
applications of law to fact de novo. " Wright, 505 U.S. at 294 (plurality opinion). Four Jus
tices opposed this claim, pointing out that the assumption that legal questions were to be
reviewed deferentially under Teague was incorrect. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 303 {O'Connor,
J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., concurring) ("Justice Thomas mischaracterizes
Teague v. Lane. . . . Teague did not establish a 'deferential' standard of review of state court
determinations of federal law." (citation omitted)); Wright, 505 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
•

52. See Liebman, supra note 22, at 2031-32.
53. See, e.g., Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.

.
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are applicable to the habeas corpus petition.s4 Second, the federal
court uses the precedent deemed applicable during the first stage to
conduct a de novo review of the state court's legal determinations.ss
Th.us, even after Teague the federal court independently deter
mined the correct rule of law and issues the wnt if it finds that the
state court's decision deviated from that rule.s6 By only permitting
precedent containing legal principles that existed at the time of con
viction, Teague limited the scope of de novo review.
Three Justices have suggested, however, that Teague may not
merely limit the scope of de novo review. but replaces it altogether
with a deferential standard.s1 This argument is based on Teague's
analysis of how lower courts are to make the critical distinction be
tween "old rules" and "new rules." A reasonableness test is the
hallmark of a deferential standard, and Teague does distinguish be
tween old and new rules with a reasonableness inquiry.s8 This
claim, however, confuses the first and second stages of analysis.
Teague imports a reasonableness inquiry into its retroactivity deter
minations, but this inquiry only affects the first stage of analysis. If
a reasonableness inquiry functioned within the second stage as well,
then the federal court would issue the writ only when the state
court's legal determination was unreasonable relative to the correct
rule of law and not merely when the state court's decision differed
from that rule. As Teague does not impose such restrictions, it does
not create deferential review.
Indeed, deferential review would have gone far beyond the
Teague Court's reasoning. The chief rationale behind Teague is the
desire not to reverse state courts when they have properly applied
the law as it existed at the time of conviction.s9 A deferential stan
dard, however, would grant state courts a license to ignore the state
of the law and instead to apply their own interpretations Qf the
Constitution, so long as those interpretations a r e not
"unreasonable."60
54. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534-35 (1991) (plurality
opinion) ("[R]etroactivity is properly seen in the first instance as a matter of choice of law
");see also Liebman, supra note 22, at 2031-32.
55. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 309 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("With this [Teague] safeguard
in place
de novo review can be exercised within its proper sphere.").
56. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 305 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he duty of the federal
court in evaluating whether a rule is 'new' is not the same as deference; federal courts must
make an independent evaluation of the precedent existing at the time the state conviction
became final
).
57. See Wright, $05 U.S. at 294 (plurality opinion). The Justices ultimately declined to
reach the issue, however. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 295.
58. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
60. See Liebman, supra note 22, at 2032-33.
•

.

.

.

.

•

•

.

•
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For these reasons, the retroactivity standard established in
Teague and codified by section 2254(d)(l) does not change the stan
dard of review for legal and mixed questions, but rather changes the
scope of that review. This retroactivity rule strictly limits the prece
dent applicable to habeas corpus petitions. It ensures that the fed
eral court reviews the state court criminal conviction against federal
case law as it existed at the time of petitioner's conviction. This
includes two sets of precedent: first, any pre-conviction case, and
second, those few postconviction cases "dictated" by precedent in
existence when petitioner's conviction became final.61
B.

"As Determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."

The statutory phrase "as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States" further restricts the precedent available for the
federal court's review of the state court conviction to Supreme
Court decisions. Just as the phrase "clearly established" lays out
the general contours of the federal case law available for legal and
mixed question analyses, the phrase "as determined by the

61. Federal judges have recently disagreed as to whether the phrase "clearly established"
permits a federal court to issue the writ of habeas corpus in situations in which it cannot point
to a specific Supreme Court decision explicitly establishing the right the petitioner seeks but
in which the federal judge believes the right is implicit in the Supreme Court's general ap·
proach to that area of Jaw. Compare Blankenship v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 1202, 1211 (5th Cir.
1997) (Parker, J., dissenting) (arguing for the latter position) and Childress v. Johnson, 103
F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997) (reviewing state court conviction against the Supreme Court's
Sixth Amendment case law) with Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that habeas corpus petitioners "must be able to point to an authoritative decision of the
Supreme Court in order to secure a writ") and Blankenship, 106 F.3d at 1205-06 (majority
opinion) (reviewing a state court conviction soley against the Supreme Court's decision in
Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)).
This Note argues that federal courts should look to the Supreme Court's general ap
proach to an area of Jaw, not only to the Court's individual decisions. The amendment in
structs federal courts to review a state court conviction against "clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)
(West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). If Congress had meant to point to specific Supreme
Court decisions, it easily could have replaced "law" with "decision of the Supreme Court" or
something equivalent. Instead, here "law" is used broadly. Also, the phrase "clearly estab
lished" does not require federal courts to base their decision on a particular Supreme Court
case. Applying the Teague rule in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992), the Supreme
Court issued a writ of habeas corpus based on its overall approach to the Eighth Amendment
and sentencing in capital cases even though the relevant legal proposition was not found in
"any single case." In doing so the Court explicitly rejected the dissent's argument that it
must base a writ on a legal proposition derived from a single case. Finally, the Supreme
Court takes so few cases a year that it would be very unlikely that the events underlying a
habeas petition will ever "precisely track the facts of a case decided by the Supreme Court."
Blankenship, 106 F.3d at 1211 (Parker, J., dissenting). Such an interpretation would virtually
eliminate federal habeas corpus. Although the 1996 amendment does significantly curtail
federal habeas corpus as a viable remedy, there is no evidence that opposing sides in Con
gress agreed to kill it, particularly in such a discreet fashion.

November 1997]

Note - Habeas Corpus

445

Supreme Court of the United States" refines these boundaries to
include only Supreme Court decisions.6 2
Legislative history is also clear on this point. Senator Joseph R.
Biden, for example, recognized this limitation when he noted that
"even if there is a Federal court decision directly on point, the state
court could ignore it as long as the application of law had not been
directly decided by the Supreme Court."6 3 Thus, the newly
amended statute draws the scope of federal habeas corpus review
even more narrowly than case law prior to the new amendment did,
not only codifying Teague but attaching a restriction in addition to
it.64
II.

SEPARATE CLAUSES FOR LEGAL AND MIXED QUESTIONS
UNDER SECTION 2254(D)(1)

This Part examines how section 2254(d)(l) affects the standard
of review for both legal and mixed questions. Two views exist as to
how this new amendment operates.65 Proponents of both views
agree that the phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable applica
tion" govern the standards of review for legal and mixed ques
tions.66 Both agree that the provision naturally breaks down into
62. See, e.g., Lindh, 96 F.3d at 869 ("State courts must knuckle under to decisions of the
Supreme Court, but not of this court.").
63. 141 CONG. REc. S7842 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden).
64. A circuit split has recently emerged on the issue of whether federal courts applying
§ 2254(d)(l) can use non-Supreme Court case law to help interpret relevant Supreme Court
decisions. Compare Bocian v. Godinez, 101 F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that fed
eral courts "must look exclusively to Supreme Court caselaw")"with Martin v. Bissonette, No.
96-1856, slip op. at 19-20 (1st Cir. May 29, 1997) (holding that lower court opinions are avail
able to help explain the Supreme Court's decision), vacated on different grounds, 118 F.3d
871 (1st Cir. 1997).
65. Compare Yackle, supra note 10, at 437 (utilizing the nonexclusive approach) with
Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868-70 (applying the mutually exclusive approach). The First Circuit and a
court in the Eleventh Circuit recently set forth a third understanding of§ 2254(d)(l)'s opera
tion. See supra note 34. Those courts argue that under§ 2254(d)(l), both legal and mixed
questions go through the same analytical framework, and that the two clauses are simply
separate stages of that analysis. See supra note 34. Their rationale is twofold. First, they
argue that Congress did not explicitly differentiate between the review of legal and mixed
questions. Second, they contend that Congress actually rejected an earlier bill that would
have imposed a rigid taxonomy by which legal and mixed questions were reviewed under
different clauses. See,. e.g., Martin v. Bissonette, No. 96-1856, slip op. at 21.
As for the first criticism, although Congress did not state in the statutory text that legal
and mixed question analyses were to differ, members of Congress did make explicit state
ments to that effect during the floor debates. See infra section II.B.1. The criticism that
Congress "rejected" the bill is an overstatement; actually, the House approved it, but the
Senate never voted on it. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 435. Indeed, it later served as the
draft for S. 735, the bill that eventually became the 1996 amendment to § 2254(d)(l). See
Yackle, supra note 10, at 435-36. This suggests that courts could legitimately draw on at the
least the more general features of the "rejected" bill for legislative history, such as its under
lying taxonomy. In any event, the bill is at best inconclusive: There exist three separate
interpretations of the bill, see infra section II.B.2., making it a fragile foundation upon which
to build an entire approach to§ 2254(d)(l).
66. See, e.g., Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868-70; Yackle, supra note 10, at 384.
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two clauses:6 7 the writ will not issue unless the conviction "was con
trary to ...clearly established Federal law"6 S or "involved an unrea
sonable application of[] clearly established Federal law." 6 9
The dispute lies in determining how these two clauses apply to
legal and mixed questions. One approach, described here as the
mutually exclusive approach, argues that the two clauses are mutu
ally exclusive and that the "contrary to" clause governs legal ques
tions, while the "unreasonable application" clause reviews mixed
questions.10 The second approach, described here as the nonexclu
sive approach, contends that either clause can govern both legal and
mixed questions, and that habeas corpus petitioners choose the
clause under which to bring their claim.71 This approach predicts
that because the "contrary to" clause gives the federal court greater
license to vacate the state court conviction, the habeas corpus peti
tioner will always seek review under the "contrary to" clause, ren
dering the "unreasonable application" clause "superfiuous." 72
Resolving this question is of enormous importance. The two
clauses dictate two different standards of review.73 As such, the
federal judiciary's power to enforce its interpretation of the Consti
tution turns on which clause, and hence which standard of review,
governs a particular claim. This Part asserts that the two clauses are
mutually exclusive. Section II.A argues that the statute's plain lan
guage naturally organizes legal and mixed questions into two sepa
rate clauses, whereas section II.B contends that the legislative
history reflects a similar congressional understanding.
A.

·

The Text of Section 2254(d) (l)

A careful analysis of section 2254(d)(l) reveals that questions of
law should fall exclusively under the "contrary to" clause, while the
"unreasonable application" clause should encompass mixed ques
tions. The "contrary to" clause instructs the federal court to review
the state court conviction to determine whether it is "contrary to ...
clearly established Federal law."74 On its face, this clause refers to
"law," indicating that it addresses only the purely legal findings of
the state court. On the other hand, the "unreasonable application"
clause modifies the word "law" to emphasize a review of an "appli67.
68.
. 69.
70.
71.
72.

See, e.g., Lindh, 96 F.3d at 870; Yackle, supra note 10, at 384.

U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(l) (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
28 U.S.C.A.§ 2254(d)(l) (emphasis added).
See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868-70.
See Yackle, supra note 10, at 437.
28

See id.

73. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868-70; see also infra Parts III, IV.
74. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(l).
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cation of . . . law."75 Applications of law are traditionally synony
mous with mixed questions of law and fact,76 suggesting that this
clause deals with mixed questions. Thus, the use of the unqualified
term "law" in the "contrary to" clause indicates that it refers to
legal questions, while the change to "application of . . . law" in the-
"unreasonable application" clause targets mixed questions.
By contrast, the alternative, nonexclusive approach is not firmly
grounded in the statutory text. According to this interpretation, pe
titioners have a choice as to which clause governs their claim. Be
cause petitioners would naturally choose the standard that reviews
their convictions more extensively, the de novo "contrary to" clause
would render the deferential "unreasonable application" clause su
perfiuous.77 Yet this interpretation violates elementary "rules of
statutory construction [that] declare that a legislature is presumed
to have used no superfluous words. "7 8 A more reasonable reading
gives effect to both clauses of the provision.
Moreover, this nonexclusive interpretation erroneously empha
sizes the word "decision." According to the language of the "con
trary to" clause, the federal judge tests the state court "decision" to
determine if it is "contrary to . . . law."7 9 Proponents of the nonex
clusive approach argue that the first clause must encompass both
legal and mixed questions because a state court's decision includes
both the legal and mixed determinations in a case. so
This view, if it proves anything, proves too much. In addition to
legal and mixed determinations, a state court's decision includes
factual findings as well. Therefore, an inevitable consequence of
this argument is that section 2254(d)(l)'s first clause must also treat
questions of fact. Yet that would render the next statutory provi
sion, section 2254(d)(2), superfluous as well. Section 2254( d)(2) in
structs federal courts to grant the writ if the State court's decision
"was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 81 This
provision's exclusive mention of "facts" indicates that section
75.

28

U.S.C.A.§ 2254(d)(l).

76. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 459 (1995) (observing that a mixed
question "calls for application of the controlling standard to the historical facts"); Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985) (noting that a mixed question requires an application of law
to fact).
77. See supra text accompanying note 72.
78. Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 45, 58 (1878); see also, e.g., United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992).
79. See 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2254(d)(l).
80. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 384; see also Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 778 (5th
Cir. 1996) (Garza, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1114 (1997).
81. 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2254(d)(2).
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2254(d)(2) concerns itself solely with questions of fact.82 Including
review of factual findings under section 2254(d)(l) thus would re
quire a court to render meaningless an entire subsection of the stat
ute - straining the rules of statutory construction even further.
A simpler reading of the "contrary to" clause is that although
the word "decision" might refer to any of the legal, mixed, and fac
tual determinations in a case, the language of each clause identifies
the aspect of the state court's decision to which it applies. Thus the
phrase "contrary to law" in the first clause isolates the legal ques
tions addressed by the state court's decision, while the wording "ap
plication of law" in the second clause isolates the mixed questions
decided by the state court.
B.

The Legislative History

The legislative history underlying section 2254(d)(l) further in
dicates that Congress understood the "contrary to" and "unreason
able application" clauses to be mutually exclusive. Section II.B.1
asserts that this congressional intent existed throughout the Senate
:floor debates about S. 735, the bill that became the 1996 amend
ment to section 2254(d). Section II.B.2 then counters objections
raised by proponents of the nonexclusive approach, concluding that
the legislative history of S. 735's predecessor bill does not reveal
any contrary congressional intent.
1.

The Floor Debates Over S. 735

The Senate understood section 2254(d)(l) to treat legal ques
tions and mixed questions under separate clauses. This is evidenced
by explicit statements made by both the bill's supporters and oppo
nents in Congress.
Senator Arlen Specter, who co-sponsored S. 735, explained that
the bill distinguishes between treatment of legal, mixed, and factual
questions. He explained that it would
continue to require deference to State court's findings of fact. Fed
eral courts will owe no deference to State courts' determinations of
federal law, whic_h is appropriate in our Federal system. However,
under [S. 735] deference will be owed to State court's decisions on the
application of Federal law to the facts.83

Senator Specter, himself a lawyer, consciously separated state court
findings into three categories: findings of fact, determinations of
law, and applications of law to facts. Such a classification scheme
exactly mirrors the three categories of factual, legal, and mixed
82. But see Note, supra note 45, at 1874-76 (commenting on an emerging judicial split
over whether§ 2254(d)(2) or§ 2254(e)(l) governs factual questions).
83. 142 CoNo. REc. S3472 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter).
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questions.8 4 Furthermore, Senator Specter explicitly segregated the
st andards of review for legal and mixed questions, suggestin g that
different st atutory language governs legal and mixed quest ions. Fi
nal ly, Senator Specter's st at ement also clarifies that federal law is
being applied to the facts underlying the habeas corpus claim. This
supports t he claim that the " unreasonable applicat ion" clause must
exclude legal questions because facts are a major, if not the chief,
component in any analysis under this clause.85 Together, these ref
erences indicat e that Congress int ended for t he clauses in section
2254(d)(l) to t reat legal and mixed questions separat el y.
S. 735 's opponents also shared this understanding. For example,
during debate on a proposal to eliminate t he drafted amendment t o
section 2254(d)(l) altogether, Senator William Cohen announced,
"I believe the writ's core function of affording independent Federal
review to mixed quest ions of law and fa ct should be retained and
that the deference provision in S. 735 shoul d be withdrawn."8 6 Sen
at or Cohen targeted for criticism the proposed amendment's effect
on mixed questions, suggesting that S. 735 t reated mixed quest ions
diff erently from other habeas corpus claims. M oreover, that Sena
tor Cohen directed his criticism exclusively toward t he st andard for
mixed questions indicates that the st atut e does not simi larly burden
legal questions. This implies that the st andard of review, and hence
the govern ing st at ut ory clause, is different for each.
The nonexclusive int erpretation of section 2254(d)(l) is not as
wel l- grounded in legislative history. That approach emphasiz es t he
" contrary t o" clause's importance to t he exclusion of the " unrea
sonable application" clause, rendering t he latter " superfiuous."87
Yet had Congress held that view, one would expect the legislat ors
to have paid scant att ention to t he " unreasonable application"
clause. E xa mining the l egislative history, however, leads t o t he op
posit e conclusion. Senators Joseph Biden and E dward Kennedy
aimed their crit icism of t he bill at the " unreasonable application"
clause of the provision and almost entirely ignored t he " cont rary

84.

See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
85. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (describing mixed
questions as "questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of
law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [legal] standard" (emphasis
added)).
86. 141 CONG. REc. S7839 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Cohen}. Senator
Cohen was quoting a letter written by Columbia University Law Professor Henry Monaghan.
Senator Cohen's statement additionally supports the argument, advanced by Part IV of this
Note, that federal courts are to review deferentially a state court's resolution of mixed ques
tions. Senator Cohen explicitly observed that mixed questions will no longer be reviewed de
novo.
87.

See supra text accompanying note 72.
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to" clause.88 Moreover, members of Congress repeatedly described
S. 735 as creating · deference to state courts' determinations of
mixed questions89 - an effect possible only if the second clause
played a significant role. The extent of congressional attention paid
to the second clause amplifies the argument that the two clauses are
mutually exclusive.
2.

S. 735's Predecessor

Proponents of the nonexclusive approach contend that the
habeas corpus reform bill proposed immediately prior to S. 735, and
the language of which became the rough draft for S. 735, signals
Congress's intent to have legal and mixed questions reviewed under
the "contrary to" clause.90 In 1995, Representative Christopher
Cox proposed amending section 2254(d) to instruct federal courts
not to issue the writ unless the state court's decision was based on
either an "arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation of clearly estab
lished Federal law," an "arbitrary or unreasonable application to
the facts of clearly established Federal law," or an "arbitrary or un
reasonable determination of the facts."91 Although Representative
Cox's bill failed to become law,92 adherents of the nonexclusive
view argue that the debates on Representative Cox's proposal led
to a vital legislative compromise that fundamentally affects the
meaning of section 2254(d)(l). Representative Cox's proposal di
rected federal courts not to grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the
state court decision involved an "arbitrary or unreasonable" appli
cation of law to facts.93 House opponents, however, criticized the
phrase "arbitrary or unreasonable," arguing that the "arbitrary"
standard was too harsh.94 Representative Cox responded by con
ceding that the "or" between arbitrary and unreasonable allowed
petitioners to choose whether they wished to bring suit under the
"arbitrary" or "unreasonable" standard.95 Because federal courts
88. See 141 CONG. REC. S7841 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden); 141
CoNG. REc. S7809 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
89. See, e.g., 141 CoNG. REc. S7878 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
("The legislation before us will require our Federal courts to defer to State court judgments
unless a State court's application of Federal law is unreasonable."); 141 CONG. REC. S4596
(daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
90. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 433-38. For a third interpretation of this bill, see supra
note 65.
91. 141 CoNG. REc. H1424 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
92. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 435.
93. See 141 CONG. REc. H1424 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
94. See, e.g., 141 CoNG. REc. Hl426 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Watt).
95. See 141 CoNG. REc. H1426 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) ("I just
point out that the language of the amendments says reasonable. It also says arbitrary. But a
separate standard is reasonable. It is arbitrary or unreasonable. Obviously, the reasonable
ness test is the more difficult to meet.").
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have more power to vacate the state court conviction under an "un
reasonable" standard, petitioners would naturally choose to bring
suit under that standard. In this way, Representative Cox con
sciously disowned the "arbitrary" standard altogether.
Although this compromise failed to rescue the House bill from
defeat, adherents of the nonexclusive approach contend that S. 735
incorporates this concession. They argue that the disjunctive "or"
between the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses
in section 2254(d)(l) replicates the "or" between "arbitrary" and
"unreasonable" in Representative Cox's bill, thereby providing
habeas corpus petitioners with a choice between the "contrary to"
and "unreasonable application" clauses.96
This claim, however, raises three problems. First, it confuses
one "or" with another. The "or" of which Representative Cox
spoke existed within each clause - one within the clause regarding
legal questions, and the other within the clause regarding mixed
questions.97 The "or" on which nonexclusive proponents focus lies
between these numbered clauses.98 Thus, under Representative
Cox's bill, petitioners had a choice as to which of the multiple stan
dards provided for each type of question governed their claim.99
Despite that concession, however, there remained only one clause
for each type of question.
0

Second, Representative Cox's bill provides evidence that its suc
cessor, the 1996 amendment to section 2254(d), reviews legal and
mixed questions separately. Representative Cox explicitly stated
that his bill addressed questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed
questions of law and fact.10° Considering that his bill contains three
96. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 437 (indicating that one phrase contained a more de
manding standard than the other, rendering the latter phrase superfluous).
97. See 141 CoNG. REC. Hl426 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (focusing
on the "or" between "arbitrary" and "unreasonable"); see also 141 CONG. REc. H1424 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (proposing that habeas petitions should not be
granted unless the state adjudication "(l) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbi
trary or unreasonable interpretation [of precedent]; (2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an arbitrary or unreasonable application [to the facts of precedent]; or (3) resulted in a
decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable determination [of facts]" (emphasis
added)).
98. The meaning ascribed to a word in one context cannot be transferred automatically to
another merely because it is the same word. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489
U.S. 803, 809 (1989) ("It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme."). This is especially true for disjunctives like the word "or" that have the purpose of
creating a choice. See BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 2422 (8th ed. 1914). See generally BoB
DOROUGH, Conjunction Junction, on SCHOOLHOUSE RO CK: GRAMMAR RO CK (ABC, Inc.
1997) ("Conjunction Junction, what's your function? Hookin' up cars and makin' 'em
function.").
99. See supra note 95.
100. See 141 CONG. REC. H1426 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) ("Sim
ply stated, the Federal courts will defer to reasonable decisions on the facts, reasonable deci'
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subsections, it makes sense that each governs one of the three types
of claims. Given that the newly amended section 2254(d) similarly
has three operative parts,101 it is reasonable to assume that this in
tent lay underneath section 2254(d)(1) as well.
Finally, the floor debates for S. 735 are devoid of any evidence
that Representative Cox's concession influenced the understanding
of the eventual 1996 amendment to section 2254(d)(l).1 02 For these
reasons, the nonexclusive interpretation of the statutory history is
fl.awed. The more reasonable interpretation of section 2254(d)(1) is
that it separates questions of law from mixed questions of fact and
law.
III. THE STANDARD FOR LEGAL QUESTIONS

This Part addresses the standard of review contained in the
"contrary to" clause. That clause instructs federal courts not to
grant the writ unless the state court's decision was "contrary to . . .
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States."1 03 Section III.A argues that the "con
trary to" language establishes a de novo standard of review. Sec
tion III.B rejects a competing interpretation of the clause known as
"procedural deference."
sions on the law, and reasonable decisions on mixed questions of law and fact made at the
State courts.").
101. The three operative parts are the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application"
clauses from§ 2254(d)(l) and§ 2254(d)(2). Between the drafting of Representative Cox's
bill and S. 735, the two subsections for legal and mixed questions were merged into one.
Arguably this was intended to be a substantive change. If so, that change would mean that
the two bills are not analogous and that courts could not draw conclusions based on compar
ing the two. No explanation for this change is found, however, in the legislative history. It
seems unlikely that a substantive change would be made without being noted somewhere,
especially given the bill's prominence. See, e.g., Edwin Yoder, Delays May Make Capital
Punishment Crue� Unusua� SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 5, 1995, at A9. In any event, a more
likely explanation is that the separate standards for legal and mixed questions were placed
into one subsection because the language relating to the retroactivity rule overlapped. See
supra Part I.
102. Proponents of the nonexclusive approach cite only to a letter sent by Senator Orrin
Hatch to a witness before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 438
n.186. Senator Hatch wrote in response to the witness's testimony: "Could you expand on
how an interpretation of federal constitutional law could be wrong, that is contrary to estab
lished federal law, and yet still be a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution?" Yackle,
supra note 10, at 438 n.186. Because he pairs the two phrases together, Senator Hatch's
question suggests he viewed the statute as collapsing the "contrary to" and "unreasonable
application" clauses into one another. Arguably, this could mean that Senator Hatch thought
that any legal error by the state court was unreasonable if it did not conform to the federal
judiciary's constitutional interpretation. This view does not conflict with this Note's argu
ment. Senator Hatch was speaking of legal questions, not mixed questions. The statute does
not impose a reasonableness inquiry on questions of law. If the state court's legal determina
tions do not conform to the federal judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution, the federal
court may grant habeas. See infra Part III.
103. 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2254(d)(l) (West Supp. 1997).
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"Contrary to . . . law"

This clause creates a de novo standard of review by directing
federal courts to deny the writ of habeas corpus unless the state
court's decision was "contrary to . . . law."104 This statement con
tains none of the usual language, such as "reasonable," typically as
sociated with deferential review.105 Moreover, while a deferential
standard would preserve some incorrect state court decisions,106 the
statutory language on its face permits issuance of the writ whenever
the federal court believes the state court decision is incorrect. Sen
ator Hatch explained the "contrary to" language as follows: "In
deed, this standard gives the Federal court the authority to review
de novo whether the State court decided the claim in contravention
of Federal law. "107
The 1996 amendment to section 2254(d)(l) did not alter the un
derlying de novo standard of review for legal questions. However,
the newly revised statute does curtail the de novo analysis by signif
icantly restricting the scope of that review by limiting the precedent
usable in that analysis to clearly established Supreme Court deci
sions.1os With these changes, a state court conviction will now be
vacated by a federal writ of habeas corpus only if that conviction is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's case law as it existed at the
time of the petitioner's conviction.
B.

Section 2254(d) (l) Does Not Create Procedural Deference

One commentator suggests that section 2254(d)(1) creates a
procedurally deferential standard of review.109 He contends that
prior to the passage of the 1996 amendment to section 2254(d)(1),
federal courts reviewed legal questions under a "peculiar" version
of de novo review by which the federal court ignored entirely the
state court judgment and effectively redecided the case.110 This dif
fers from the "classical" understanding of de novo review, in which
104. See 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2254(d)(l).
105. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 481 U.S. 573, 596 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
106. See supra text accompanying note 12.
107. 141 CoNG. REc. S7848 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis
added).
108. See supra Part I.
109. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 412. One federal district court has gone further and
held that the provision enacts a deferential standard for legal questions. That court reasoned
that the statute's language was so similar to Teague that Congress must have meant to codify
Teague. See Duncan v. Calderon, 946 F. Supp. 805, 812 (C.D. Cal. 1996). The Duncan court,
however, mistakenly assumed that Teague creates a deferential standard of review. While
§ 2254(d)(l) does codify Teague, that case affects the scope, not the standard, of review. See
supra section I.A.
110. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 412.
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appellate courts start with, rather than ignore, the legal determina
tions of the state court and then independently decide whether the
state court's judgment comports with federal law.111 According to
the procedural deference approach, the "contrary to" clause shifts
decisionmaking from the "peculiar" habeas corpus de novo stan
dard back to the "classical" version. This return to the classical ver
sion of habeas corpus review is called "procedural deference"
because it inserts the procedural step of beginning with the state
court's determination.112
The "procedural deference" interpretation of the "contrary to"
clause is incorrect. There is no proof that federal courts ever ap
plied a "peculiar" version of de novo review; the architect of the
procedural deference understanding does not cite to any evidence
substantiating such a version of habeas corpus history. In fact, Sen
ator Edward M. Kennedy observed exactly the opposite during the
debates over the 1996 amendment to section 2254(d)(1): "No one
thinks that under current law the Federal courts just ignore State
court decisions, even on questions of Federal constitutional law.
The federal courts respect the State courts and give their decisions a
great deal of attention."113 That this observation echoes the re
peated instructions of the Supreme Court114 further suggests that
the procedural deference argument rests on its own "peculiar" ver
sion of history.
Even if a peculiar standard of de novo review did exist, the con
troversy surrounding section 2254(d)(1) indicates that much larger
problems preoccupied the statute's drafters. If the "contrary to"
clause enacts procedural deference, the only concrete change in
habeas corpus would be a different "focus" by federal courts.115
While a "psychological effect" may be enough for the proponents of
this interpretation,116 it seems too small a change given the amount
of attention paid by the public and Congress to section
2254(d)(l).117
111. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
112. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 383.
113. 141 CoNo. REC. S7809 {daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
114. During de novo review of habeas petitions, "there is no need for the federal judge, if
he could, to shut his eyes to the State consideration of such issues." Brown, 344 U.S. at 508
(Frankfurter, J.); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 288 {1992) {plurality opinion of
Thomas, J.) (citing Brown, 344 U.S. 443).
115. See Yackle, supra note 10, at 413 ("This difference is one of focus, to be sure, but it is
an important difference of focus that delineates the federal court's function. In constitutional
adjudication . . . it makes a good deal of practical difference whether a decision-maker shoul
ders initial responsibility for addressing and resolving a question or, instead, limits his judg
ment to whether a previous decision-maker reached the correct result. It is that
psychological effect that § 2254(d) attempts to achieve." (second emphasis added)).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., William Neikirk, Controversial Bill on Anti-Terrorism Signed, Cm. Trua.,
Apr. 25, 1996, at § 1 at 7.
•
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Finally, and perhaps most important, the procedural deference
argument is not tied to any of the statute's actual language. It never
explains what effect the crucial phrase "clearly established" has on
that analysis or on the language "as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States." Thus, the procedural deference stan
dard appears to misunderstand section 2254(d)(l).
IV.

THE STANDARD FOR MlxED QUESTIONS

This Part addresses the "unreasonable application" clause in
section 2254(d)(l) that directs federal courts to deny the writ of
habeas corpus unless the state court's decision involved an "unrea
sonable application of[ ] clearly established Federal law, as deter
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States."118 When
compared to its counterpart phrase "contrary to," which creates a
de novo standard for legal questions, it becomes apparent that the
"unreasonable application" clause creates a different standard for
mixed questions. Section IV.A asserts that the "unreasonable ap
plication" clause enacts a deferential standard of review. Section
IV.B defends this assertion against objections attacking its
constitutionality.
A.

The Meaning of the "Unreasonable Application" Clause

This section contends that the "unreasonable application"
clause instructs federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief only if
the state court's application of the law to the facts was unreasona
ble rather than merely incorrect. In other words, this language cre
ates a deferential standard of review for mixed questions of fact and
law.119
"Unreasonable" is a word commonly associated with a deferen
tial standard of review.120 If Congress had wanted to create a de
novo standard, it could easily have used a word synonymous with
"incorrect." Additionally, the legislative history makes repeated
references to a deferential standard for mixed questions. For exam
ple, Senator Joseph R. Biden's criticism of the phrase "unreasona
ble application" demonstrates this: "[A] claim can be granted only
if the State court's application of Federal law to the facts[ ] before it
was unreasonable . . . . This is an extraordinarily deferential stan
dard to the State courts . . . . "121
118. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(l) (West Supp. 1997).
119. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (en bane), revd. on other
grounds, No. 96-6298, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 3998 (June 23, 1997).
120. See NLRB, v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 481 U.S. 573, 597 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
121. 141 CONG. REc. S7842 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). See also,
e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-518, at 944 (1996).
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Some may argue that the "unreasonable application" language
actually invokes a de novo standard of review.122 One possible ex
planation for this claim can be found in Justice O'Connor's state
ment, albeit in a different context, that "any deviation from
precedent is not reasonable."123 Her comment suggests an alterna
tive understanding of the word "unreasonable" that would require
federal courts to issue the writ whenever they disagreed with the
state court's decision - in essence invoking a de novo standard of
review. Justice O'Connor's definition, however, is inapplicable to
mixed question review under section 2254(d)(l). The interpreta
tion of precedent, of which Justice O'Connor was speaking when
she defined "unreasonable," is a process significantly more associ
ated with legal question review rather than mixed question re
view .124 Furthermore, there is no evidence that Congress
considered such a definition when adopting section 2254(d)(l).
Thus, the proper interpretation of the "unreasonable application"
clause is that it creates a deferential standard of review for mixed
questions.12s
B.

A Constitutional Defense

Some have argued that the "unreasonable application" clause
cannot enact a deferential standard of review for mixed questions
because such a result would offend Article Ill's requirement of an
122. At least one judge has already argued for such a holding but has not explained why.
See Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 779 (5th Cir. 1996) (Garza, J., dissenting) (claiming

that this reasonableness inquiry can consider whether the federal court's analysis simply dis
agrees with the state court's application of law to fact and that if it finds disagreement it must
grant habeas), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1114 (1997).
123. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (describing mixed
questions as ones in which "the rule of law is undisputed"); 9A WRIGIIT & MILLER, supra
note 11, § 2588, at 604-05 (describing legal question analysis).
125. President Clinton asserted that de novo review for mixed questions should be re
tained. See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 735, 4 U.S.C.C.A.N.
961-1, 961-3 ("Some have suggested that [§ 2254(d)(l)] will limit the authority of the Federal
courts to bring their own independent judgment to bear on questions of law and mixed ques
tions of law and fact. . . . I expect that the courts, following their usual practice of construing
ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional problems, will read [§ 2254(d)(l)) to permit in
dependent Federal court review of constitutional claims
" (emphasis added)). Because
President Clinton's comments demonstrate that he believed the statute's standard for mixed
questions was constitutionally questionable, this arguably indicates that the proper interpre
tation of § 2254(d)(l) is to retain de novo review for mixed questions. See Yackle, supra note
10, at 442-43.
Presidential remarks, of course, are neither binding nor representative of legislative in
tent, but they may have probative value to the extent that they reflect a common understand
ing of the statute. In any event, President Clinton's statement is best read as a secondary
interpretation. If the constitutional problems discussed infra section IV.B required courts to
abandon the deferential reading of the statute, an altema!ive reading would exist. Thus any
such reading of the statute is irrelevant unless and until the statute is struck down as
unconstitutional.
•

.
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independent federal judiciary.126 Proponents of this view contend
that Congress invades the federal judiciary's Article III sphere of
power when it instructs those courts to give substantive deference
to state courts' mixed question determinations. In Marbury v.
Madison121 the Supreme Court interpreted Article III to empower
federal courts "to say what the law is." As the Court recently stated
in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Article III "gives the Federal Judici
ary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to ·decide them."128
Requiring substantive deference to state court decisions, critics of
section 2254(d)(l)'s constitutionality say, strips the federal courts of
their ability to say what the law is.129 Under the "unreasonable ap
plication" clause, federal courts would usually merely be ruling on
cases, rubber stamping the mixed question decisions of state courts
except in the rare cases when those decisions are "unreasonable."
Truly deciding them, this argument continues, would require the
federal courts to have the power to grant the writ whenever they
disagreed with the state court's mixed question decision. If this
constitutional attack is valid, then federal courts should follow the
canon of construction that statutes are interpreted in a manner that
renders them constitutional,130 and thus must read the "unreasona
ble application" clause to adopt a de novo standard of review for
mixed questions.
Federal courts should not accept this Article III claim for three
reasons. First, Congress is constitutionally entitled to make the de
cisions regarding the proper scope of habeas corpus.131 The Consti
tution does not require federal habeas corpus review for state
prisoners; rather, Congress created it by statute. 132 Indeed, at one
time Congress allowed only those habeas corpus petitions challeng
ing the jurisdiction of the state court.133 The restrictions imposed
by the 1996 amendment to section 2254(d)(l) pale by comparison,
suggesting that Congress acted on firm ground in amending the
statute.
Second, section 2254(d)(l) does nothing more than create a dis
tinction between rights and remedies, a distinction Congress rou
tinely and constitutionally makes. The "unreasonable application"
126. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 885-90 (7th Cir. 1996) (Ripple & Rovner, JJ.,
dissenting); Satch v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222, 1249 n.17 (E.D. Va. 1996); Brief for the
American Bar Association as Amicus CUriae at 3, Lindh, 96 F.3d 856 (No. 92-CV-690).
127. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
128. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995).
129. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 10, at 407-10.
130. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S., 361, 366-67 (1974).
131. See Martin v. Bissonette, No. 96-1856, slip op. at 25 (1st Cir. May 29, 1997), vacated
on different grounds, 118 F.3d 871 (1st Cir. 1997).
132. See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (1996).
133. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 15.2, at 786.
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clause similarly separates a petitioner's right and remedy; under this
clause, a petitioner may have a right, because if the federal court
had complete discretion it would grant the writ, but no remedy, be
cause the State court's resolution is not "unreasonable." Such dis
tinctions are far from uncommon.134 For example, qualified
immunity bars a remedy to plaintiffs suing executive officials under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, even when on the merits the plaintiff's rights have
been violated.13s Even within the realm of habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court requires federal courts to enforce decisions they
would not have made themselves.136
Finally, section 2254(d)(1) does not interfere with the sphere of
judicial independence that Article III protects. Article III creates a
federal judiciary that "'say[s] what the law is' in particular cases and
controversies."137 The Framers wrote Article III in response to a
system in which the legislature often set aside specific judgments
and ordered new trials or appeals.138 Section 2254(d)(1), however,
does not attempt to interfere with the federal judiciary's power to
resolve conclusively a particular case, but instead is a valid congres
sional attempt to write the law for future cases.139 Section
2254(d)(1) is simply a change in the underlying law.140 It is one of
Congress's chief functions to "make rules that affect classes of
cases."141 Congress did nothing more in section 2254(d)(1) than it
did when it imposed a cap on maximum damages, or allowed for
punitive damages.142 Thus, a deferential reading of the mixed ques
tion clause should not raise a serious Article III dilemma for federal
courts interpreting the 1996 amendment to section 2254(d)(1).143
134. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 872 (7th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (asserting that
"(t]his distinction between rights and remedies is fundamental" and listing examples).
135. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 873 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
136. To illustrate, Stone v. Powell instructs federal courts not to grant habeas even when
they find the state court to have erred on a legal question when deciding a Fourth Amend
ment claim. See Martin v. Bissonette, No. 96-1856, slip op. at 17-24 (1st Cir. May 29, 1997),
vacated on different grounds, 118 F.3d 871 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 482 (1976)); Lindh, 96 F.3d at 873 (listing other restrictions on habeas courts).
137. Plautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 {1995) (emphasis added) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
138. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219.
139. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 872; THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) ("A legis
lature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particu
lar case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.").
140. See, e.g., Duncan v. calderon, 946 F. Supp. 805, 813 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
141. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 872.
142. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 872.
143. But see Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 {1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We
have always held that the federal courts, even on habeas, have an independent obligation to
say what the law is."). Justice O'Connor's statement must be understood in context. It was
made specifically in response to Justice Thomas's assertion that the Court had never explic
itly recognized a de novo standard of review for legal questions in habeas. See Wright, 505
U.S. at 305. Article III considerations were never hinted at during that debate. It is there-
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CONCLUSION

Responding to many constituents who view habeas corpus as ex
emplifying how our criminal justice system puts technicalities ahead
of justice,144 Congress fundamentally altered the core of federal
habeas corpus by amending section 2254(d)(l). Federal courts
must now embark on the following statutorily driven analysis. The
federal court must first identify and separate the questions of law
from the mixed questions of law and fact.145 Then, when analyzing
the petitioner's claims, the federal court must apply the appropriate
standard of review: de novo review for legal questions, as specified
by section 2254(d)(l)'s "contrary to" clause; and deferential review
for mixed questions, as delineated in the "unreasonable applica
tion" clause. Section 2254(d)(l), however, restricts the scope of
both types of review by allowing federal courts to use only pre
conviction Supreme Court precedent and those postconviction
Supreme Court decisions that constitute "old rules" under Teague
v. Lane.
There can be little doubt that Congress's action in 1996 seriously
curtails federal habeas corpus review. Yet supporters of federal
habeas corpus should not view seeking the writ as wasted effort.
Federal habeas corpus will still serve as an avenue of relief for some
prisoners unjustly convicted or sentenced by state courts. More im
portant, perhaps, is that the politics of federal habeas corpus is a
continually shifting landscape. Shaped by the competing perspec
tives of criminal defendants and their attorneys, civil rights advo
cates, victims and their families, state governments, and even by
federal judges, these politics inevitably will continue to change as
people struggle with the emotional subtexts of the differing ap
proaches. The composition of Congress has already changed since
the passage of section 2254(d)(l),146 and there are even signs that
the Court has begun turning away from a restrictive approach to
habeas corpus.147 While there is no doubt that section 2254(d)(l)
narrowly limits relief today, there is also reason to suspect that the
politics inherent in the criminal justice system will eventually reo
pen the path to habeas corpus.
fore unlikely Justice O'Connor was making any broad statement regarding the interaction
between Article III and federal habeas.
144. See, e.g., Edwin Yoder, Delays May Make Capital Punishment Cruel, Unusual, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Apr. 5, 1995, at A9, available in 1995 WL 3130000.
145. For a discussion of how factual questions are to be handled after the 1996 amend
ment, see supra note 82 and accompanying text
146. See Eric Pianin & Clay Chandler, Conferees to Begin Improvising on Budget Theme,
WASH. PoST, July 10, 1997, at A17 (discussing Republican Party's loss of power in Congress).
147. See Melissa L. Koehn, A Line in the Sand: The Supreme Court and the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 32 TULSA L.J. 389, 390 (1997).

